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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:
:

BRENT TIMMERMAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20011022-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from convictions of possession of a controlled substance, a
second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (West 2004), and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004), in the Second Judicial District, Weber County, the Honorable
Stanton M. Taylor presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant had pulled his vehicle bearing Iowa plates to the side of a freeway onramp and was tinkering with something under the dashboard when a police officer
stopped at 3:20 a.m. to offer assistance. Did the officer have reasonable suspicion to
detain defendant for a warrants check after defendant stated that he lived in Utah,

1

This brief will cite to the current version of the Utah Code when there have been
no amendments relevant to defendant's claims.

not Iowa, gave inconsistent and evasive answers about the vehicle's owner, and
could not produce the registration?
This Court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for correctness. State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.3d 699.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a second degree
felony; with possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and with operating
a vehicle without a registration, a class C misdemeanor. Rl-2.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained when police searched his
vehicle. R18-19. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
R35-36, 41-43. A jury found defendant guilty of the possession and paraphernalia
counts. R53-55.
Defendant was sentenced to a one-to-fifteen-year indeterminate prison term on the
controlled substance conviction and a six-month jail term on the paraphernalia
conviction, the terms to run concurrently. R53-55, 110-113, 118:172. Defendant timely
appealed. R107.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The incident
Sometime before 3:20 a.m. on August 1, 2001, defendant pulled his pickup truck
off the side of the 24th Street southbound freeway on-ramp in Ogden. Rl 17:2-3;
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The charge for operating a vehicle without a registration was apparently dropped
or resolved prior to trial. See R51-55.
2

118:73-75. Officer Justin Dixon, on patrol at the time, saw the vehicle, noted its lights
were off, and observed that the "driver door was open and the driver was kind of half
hanging out like he was working on something under the dash." Rl 17:2. The officer
stopped to see whether the occupants needed assistance. Id. at 3-4. He pulled behind, but
did not block, the stopped vehicle. Id. at 4. He left his headlights on, but did not activate
any other lights. Id.
The officer got out of his car, walked up to defendant, the driver, and asked
whether he was "okay" and whether anything was wrong. Id. at 4-5. Defendant, who
was "messing with the wires or the fuse box under the dashboard," stated that "his dash
lights had just [gone] out." Id. at 5.
On his approach, the officer had noted the truck's Iowa license plates and asked
defendant where he lived. Id. Defendant said that he was from Huntsville. Id.
"[W]ondering what the deal was with the truck since it was registered out of Iowa and
[defendant] lived in Huntsville," the officer asked "who the truck belonged to." Id. "At
first [defendant] said he didn't know and then he said it was a friend's." Id.
"Eventually," defendant said that the car belonged to a friend who "had bought it from a
lady and the friend was letting him use it." Id. at 5. Defendant, however, "didn't know,
couldn't tell [the officer] who the registered owner was. He wouldn't tell [the officer] his
exact friend's [sic] name." Id. at 10. (Asked on cross-examination whether defendant
told him the friend's first name or whether defendant gave him the friend's telephone
number, the officer testified that he could not remember. Id.)

3

Following his conversation with defendant about the vehicle's owner, the officer
asked "if [he] could see [defendant's] driver's license and the registration to the vehicle
to make sure that everything with the truck was okay." Id. at 5. Defendant could not find
any "paperwork on the vehicle," but did give the officer his driver's license. Id. at 6.
The officer then asked defendant to stay in the vehicle while the officer returned to
his vehicle with the license to "check[] with dispatch." Id. at 6, 13. The officer contacted
dispatch, and had dispatch do the license, warrants, and stolen vehicle check "at the same
time." Id. at 13-14. Dispatch informed the officer that defendant's license was valid, but
that defendant had an outstanding "felony two, no-bail warrant." Id. at 6. The officer
also learned that the vehicle "was registered to a lady named Jeanine out of Iowa" and
that "[i]t wasn't reported stolen." Id.
About this time, a second officer, Officer Sean Grogen, arrived. Id. at 6-7.
Officer Dixon arrested defendant on the outstanding warrant. Id. at 6. Officer Grogen
searched the truck incident to the arrest and also conducted a vehicle inventory before
impounding it. Id. at 7. In the course of the search, Officer Grogen "found three small
baggies which field tested positive for methamphetamine" and "some burnt glass pipes
and a plastic scale" in the middle of the truck's bench seat. Id. at 7.
Trial court findings
The trial court found that "[t]he officer stopped to see if the defendant needed
assistance." R41. "[B]ecause of an out-of-state vehicle being driven by an instate driver
who was unable to give the full name of the owner of the vehicle, the officer did a license
and warrant check on the defendant." Id. The check revealed an outstanding warrant.
4

Id. "A subsequent search of the vehicle, based both upon the arrest and an inventory
required when impounding a vehicle, revealed the contraband out of which these charges
arose." Id. The court determined that "the conduct of the officer during the incident was
both professionally responsible and constitutionally permissible" and denied the motion
to suppress. Id. at 41-42.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The officer's contact with defendant was initially a level-one consensual
encounter. No detention occurred until the officer retained defendant's driver's license to
run the license, stolen vehicle, and warrants checks. At that point, the officer had
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. Several specific and articulable facts
supported reasonable suspicion. Defendant was tinkering with wires and/or fuses under
the dash when the officer stopped to offer assistance. The vehicle had Iowa plates, but
defendant gave a Utah address. When the officer asked defendant who owned the
vehicle, defendant first said that he did not know. He then said that it belonged to a
friend. He could not provide the friend's full name.
The officer properly ran a warrants check during the detention. The warrants
check constituted a reasonable means to help confirm or dispel suspicion that defendant
was in possession of a stolen vehicle. Moreover, the warrants check did not significantly
extend the detention beyond the time required for the license and stolen vehicle checks.

5

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S CONTACT WITH THE OFFICER WAS
INITIALLY A LEVEL-ONE CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER; THE
OFFICER HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN
DEFENDANT WHEN HE TOOK THE DRIVER'S LICENSE TO
RUN THE LICENSE, WARRANTS, AND STOLEN VEHICLE
CHECKS
Defendant claims that he "was detained when Officer Dixon took his driver's
license and ran a warrants check on h i m . . . . without being able to point to specific
articulable facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that [he] was engaged in
criminal activity." Br. Appellant at 6. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim. Based on
the facts and circumstances known to the officer, reasonable suspicion existed to support
the detention.
A.

No detention occurred until the officer took defendant's driver's license to
run a warrants check.
Defendant acknowledges that the incident started out as a level one '" voluntary

encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave at any
time.5" Br. Appellant at 8 (quoting State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App.
1990). He claims that that it escalated to a level two encounter when "Officer Dixon took
his driver's license and ran a warrants check on him." Id. at 6.
Defendant's analysis to this point is consistent with Utah law. "A level one citizen
encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual encounter wherein a citizen
voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer." State v. Hansen, 2002
UT 125, H 34, 63 P.3d 650 (internal citations omitted). "[L]aw enforcement officers do
not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or
6

in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by
putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen .. . ." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 497 (1983). "If there is no detention—no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment—then no constitutional rights have been infringed." Id. at 498.
"[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980). "A person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force or a
show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained." Id. at 553; accord Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,13(1968).
Here, the initial contact between the officer and defendant was a level-one
consensual encounter. The officer pulled up behind defendant's vehicle to determine
whether the occupants needed assistance. Rl 17:2-4. He did not pull defendant over, and
therefore defendant was not detained as he might have been in a traffic stop. See id. The
officer did not block defendant's egress. Id. at 4. Further, while the officer left his
headlights on, he did not activate any other lights. Id. at 3. Thus, he made no show of
authority. He simply approached the truck, as he might have approached any disabled
vehicle.
The officer then asked defendant several questions—whether he was all right,
where he lived, and who owned the truck. Id. at 5. The questions were of the kind that
any passer-by, stopping to help, might have asked. Again, nothing suggests that the
officer made any show of authority. There was no "threatening presence of several
7

officers," no "display of a weapon," no "physical touching of [defendant]," and no "use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554; see also Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at \ 41. A
reasonable person in defendant's position would have believed that he was free to leave.
The officer next asked defendant "if [he] could see [defendant's] driver's license
and registration to make sure that everything with the truck was okay." Rl 17:5. "It is
well settled that [a] request for identification alone d[oes] not constitute a level two stop."
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, \ 12, 998 P.2d 274. The officer had not
effectuated a traffic stop, and nothing indicates that he suggested that defendant had to
produce the license or registration or that defendant was not free to leave. Rl 17:5-6.
Rather, he made a cordial request to view the information, and defendant cooperated by
producing his license and by informing the officer that he could not locate the
registration. See id.; see also Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at ^f 13. Again, a reasonable person
in defendant's position would have believed that he was free to leave. Thus, to this point,
the interchange was a consensual encounter.
The incident, however, escalated to a level-two encounter or detention when the
officer retained defendant's license to run a warrants check and asked defendant to
remain in his vehicle. See id. at 6. At that point, a reasonable person in defendant's
position would not have felt free to leave. See Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at ^ 13-17
(holding that generally a person would not feel free to leave when the person's
identification or other important papers are retained by a law enforcement officer while
the officer runs a warrants check).
8

B.

The officer had reasonable suspicion to support his detention of defendant
when he retained defendant's driver's license to run license, warrants, and
stolen vehicle checks.
Defendant argues that police lacked reasonable suspicion to support the detention.

Br. Appellant at 6. Defendant apparently believes that the facts and circumstances
known to the officer were insufficient to support reasonable suspicion. Id. He suggests
that the officer should "have attempted to obtain more information about the owner" or
"have looked at the license plate and r[u]n an NCIC check to see if the vehicle was
stolen." Id. at 13. Instead of procuring additional facts, the officer "took defendant's
driver's license and ran a warrants check on him." See id. By so doing, defendant
claims, the officer acted on "an .. . inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."
Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 1991)).
Defendant's claim fails. The facts and circumstances within the officer's
knowledge sufficed to support reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen and to justify
the detention.
The protections of the Fourth Amendment "extend to brief investigatory stops of
persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002). "[T]he police can . . . briefly detain a person for investigative purposes
if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal
activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Courts look at "totality of
facts and circumstances . . . to determine if there are sufficient "specific and articulable
facts" to support reasonable suspicion.'" State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, f 11, 999 P.2d 7
9

(quoting State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994)) (in turn quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 21) (additional citations omitted). "Although an officer's reliance on a mere
'hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to
the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a
preponderance of the evidence standard." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (citing Terry, 392 U.S.
at 27, and Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7).
Courts "accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent
and suspicious actions." State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, f 8, 47 P.3d 932. In other
words, courts allow officers "to draw on their own experience and specialized training to
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them
that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (citation omitted).
In all cases, courts must "avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in
isolation from each other." State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, \ 14, 78 P.3d 590 (citing
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274).
Here, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle might have
been stolen when he took defendant's license and returned to his police vehicle to contact
dispatch. Reasonable suspicion was supported by several "specific and articulable" facts.
Defendant appeared to be tinkering with wiring under the dashboard at 3:00 a.m.
Rl 17:2-3. He was driving an out-of-state vehicle, but stated that he lived in Utah. Id. at
5. When asked who owned the car, defendant first stated that "he didn't know." Id. He
then contradicted that statement by saying the car belonged to a friend. Id. Defendant

10

"couldn't tell [the officer] who the registered owner was." Id. at 10.3 These "specific
and articulable facts," when viewed together, supported a "reasonable suspicion" that the
vehicle was stolen. And defendant's subsequent failure to produce the registration was
an additional "articulable fact[]" that supported reasonable suspicion "that criminal
activity 'may [have been] afoot.'" Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
Thus, when the officer took defendant's license and detained him, the officer had
reasonable suspicion to support the detention. While he might have attempted to procure
additional facts prior to taking defendant's license, he did not violate the Fourth
Amendment by detaining defendant on the basis of the facts and circumstances known to
him at the time of the detention.
Defendant's cites State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 761, to support his claim that the
officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Br. Appellant at 11. Johnson,

Defendant claims that, despite this testimony, the officer "couldn't remember
whether the Defendant had given him a name and phone number for the owner." Br.
Appellant at 13. That statement is only partially supported by the record. The officer
testified that defendant "wouldn't tell [him] his exact friend's [sic] name." Rl 17:10.
Asked whether defendant could have given him the friend's "first name," the officer
stated that he could not remember. Id. Asked whether defendant could have given him
the friend's phone number, the officer again stated that he could not remember. Id.
The trial court found that defendant was "unable to give the full name of the
owner of the vehicle." R41. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant gave the
officer his friend's first name or phone number, and defendant did not testify at the
suppression hearing. Defendant could have presented evidence about the matter at the
suppression hearing without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^[ 50 (noting the "significance" of
defendant's failure to testify at the suppression hearing and consequent failure to rebut
the officer's testimony).
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however, is distinguishable. In State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994)5 the
court referenced its earlier decision in Johnson: "We explained that '[w]hile the lack of a
registration certificate and the fact that the occupants did not own the car raised the
possibility that the car might be stolen, this information, without more, did not rise to the
level of an articulable suspicion that the car was stolen.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133
(quoting Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764). "The 'paucity of facts' available to the officer," who
had not inquired about the registered owner or checked stolen car records, "simply did
not justify the detention of the passenger." Id. (quoting Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764).
"Thus, we concluded that 'the leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of
birth to running a warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from
specific articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch.'""' Id. (quoting Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764) (in
turn quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27) (emphasis in Lopez). Defendant in this case was the
driver, not the passenger.
Moreover, Officer Dixon had much more upon which to base his suspicion than
did the officer in Johnson. Like the officer in Johnson, Officer Dixon knew that
defendant did not own the car and could not produce the registration. See Rl 17:5-6. But
unlike the officer in Johnson, Officer Dixon "inquire[d] about the registered owner and
how the occupants came into possession of the car." Compare Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764
with Rl 17:5. Defendant did not provide a "satisfactory answer" that "could have abated
[Officer Dixon's] suspicion." Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. Defendant could not tell the
officer "who the registered owner was." Rl 17:10. Instead, he gave contradictory and
12

evasive answers to the question, first stating that he didn't know who the owner was and
then stating that the owner was a friend, but that he didn't know the owner's foil name.
See Rl 17:5. Contradictory statements heighten suspicion. See Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (noting that "contradictory statements" aroused "justifiable
suspicion"); State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 227 (Utah App. 1995) (stating that "false
denials" and "evasive responses" are factors which help establish probable cause).
Defendant's "unsatisfactory answer" thus reasonably "heightened [the officer's]
suspicion" that the vehicle might have been stolen. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764.
In sum, the officers had reasonable suspicion based on several articulable facts to
believe that defendant, the driver, was in possession of a stolen vehicle. This case is
distinguishable from Johnson where the officer had only a "paucity of facts" to suggest
any criminal activity by the passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. See
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133 (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764).4
Moreover, the officer acted appropriately when he ran the warrants check. When
an officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and "a stop is made, the detention
'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop.'" City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169-70 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500).

Further, "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out
the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
13

As explained above, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the
vehicle might be stolen before he ran the warrants check. Where officers have reasonable
suspicion to make an investigatory stop, they are "entitled to run [a] warrants check."
State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1996); accord Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20) (holding that "running a warrants check during the
course of a routine traffic stop does not violated the Fourth Amendment, so long as it
does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to
request a defendant's license and valid registration and to issue a citation").5
Information that defendant had or had not been involved in the theft of other
vehicles, or, for that matter, in any other criminal activity, was relevant in assessing the
likelihood that the vehicle had been stolen. As explained by this Court, "a warrants
check is a useful and efficient weapon in the standard police arsenal for dealing with
suspicious persons." Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Utah App. 1996); see
also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n. 12 (1981), cited in Lopez, 873 P.2d at
1133 (observing that a warrants check is an "investigative technique[] which may be
utilized effectively" during a detention to "investigat[e] possible criminal activity" and
stating that it is not "inherently objectionable").

5

Chapman also explains why defendant's reliance on Johnson is misplaced. The
court stated, "In Johnson, we held that running a warrants check on & passenger in an
automobile that had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate scope of detention.'
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764) (emphasis in Chapman).
"We did not hold, however, that running a warrants check on the driver, who had
properly been stopped, would have exceeded the scope of detention." Id.
14

Moreover, running the warrants check did not" significantly extend the period of
detention beyond that reasonably necessary" to investigate the matter or beyond that
necessary to run the license and stolen vehicle checks. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133.
Defendant has not argued otherwise. Dispatch ran the warrants check concurrently with
the license and stolen vehicle checks. Rl 17:13-14. Even had dispatch run the warrants
check separately, the minimal time required would not have significantly affected the
length of the detention. "[T]he impact of a warrants check on the scope of detention is
minimal because computerized data storage renders the time for a records check
negligible." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
"[R]unning a warrants check during the course of [an investigatory detention] does not
violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of
detention beyond that reasonably necessary [to accomplish other permissible means of
investigation]." Id. at 1133 (addressing warrants checks made during the course of
routine traffic stops).
Here, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant possessed a
stolen vehicle and therefore to detain him. Once defendant had been properly detained,
the officer was entitled to run a warrants check to help confirm or dispel the possibility
that the vehicle was stolen. See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453.
In sum, the warrants check was an appropriate investigative technique to help
confirm or dispel the officer's suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. The warrant check,
conducted at the same time as the license and stolen car checks, did not unduly extend the

15

detention. Thus, running the warrants check was reasonable and permissible under the
Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Articulable facts supported reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen.
Running a warrants check was an appropriate avenue of investigation to dispel or confirm
that suspicion. Officers acted within the Fourth Amendment when, arresting defendant
on the outstanding warrant, they conducted a search incident to arrest and an inventory
incident to impoundment of the vehicle. The trial court properly denied the motion to
suppress evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia found as a result of the officers'
search. Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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